RHODES POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

11/20/2006 1:21 PM

On Art Theft, Tax, and Time:
Triangulating Ownership Disputes
Through the Tax Code

ANNE-MARIE RHODES*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 496
NAZI LOOTING OF ART....................................................................................... 499
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION .................................................................................. 502
A. Greece v. Ward: Mycenaean Treasure from Aidonia .............................. 502
B. Goodman v. Searle: Landscape with Smokestacks .................................. 504
THEFT LOSS DEDUCTION.................................................................................... 506
A. Farcasanu, Foreign Expropriation, and the Act of
State Doctrine .......................................................................................... 507
B. Menzel, Facts, and the Act of State Doctrine........................................... 510
C. Divining Congressional Intent on Foreign Expropriation ....................... 511
D. Timing...................................................................................................... 513
1. Boothe v. Commissioner................................................................... 514
2. Krahmer v. United States.................................................................. 516
3. Suddenness and Mistakes.................................................................. 518
POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF USING THE TAX CODE ............................................. 520

* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; J.D. Harvard
University. A work in progress presentation of this Article was presented to the Arts and
Literature Law Society at Harvard Law School on April 14, 2005. Able research
assistance from many Loyola University Chicago students, especially Amanda Adams and
Nora Brynes, is gratefully acknowledged. I am equally grateful for the administrative
support given to me by Audrey Murphy. Helpful commentary from colleagues, especially
David W. Hepplewhite, has improved this piece; mistakes, omissions, and errors are
mine alone. Also, I serve as Of Counsel to Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., which served as
local counsel in the 1996 Goodman v. Searle litigation, discussed infra Part III.B.
© Anne-Marie Rhodes 2006.

495

RHODES POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC

VI.

11/20/2006 1:21 PM

A. Revenue Loss ........................................................................................... 521
B. Vertical Equity ......................................................................................... 521
C. Conceptual Concerns............................................................................... 522
D. Non-Tax Considerations .......................................................................... 523
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 524

I. INTRODUCTION
In the Nuremberg Trials after World War II, Alfred Rosenberg, head
of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), was convicted of war
crimes including plunder and pillage for orchestrating the systematic and
unlawful taking of works of art.1 Tens of thousands of works were taken
from private collections and public museums. Some were destined for
Hitler’s planned museum in his hometown of Linz, Austria, some were
sold for war funds, and some were just destroyed as degenerate art.2
After the war, commissions were established to assist in the return of
looted art works.3 Much was, in fact, returned. Yet sixty years later, the

1. The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 156-58 (1946). Alfred Rosenberg was
charged in the Nuremberg Trial with all four criminal counts of crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Id. Included in the war crimes definition was
the “plunder of public or private property.” Id. at 113. The Nuremberg Tribunal found
the evidence of war crimes so overwhelming that it dealt with them generally, noting that
the Nazis implemented a systemic plunder of public or private property, including a
“wholesale seizure” of art treasures. Id. at 113, 122.
Rosenberg is responsible for a system of organized plunder of both public and
private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe. Acting under
Hitler’s orders of January 1940, to set up the “Hohe Schule,” he organized and
directed the “Einsatzstab Rosenberg,” which plundered museums and libraries,
confiscated art treasures and collections, and pillaged private houses. His own
records show the extent of the confiscations. In “Action-M” (Moebel),
instituted in December 1941 at Rosenberg’s suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes
were plundered in the West, 38,000 of them in Paris alone, and it took 26,984
railroad cars to transport the confiscated furnishings to Germany. As of July
14, 1944, more than 21,903 art objects, including famous paintings and
museum pieces, had been seized by the Einsatzstab in the West.
Id. at 157.
2. There are a number of excellent, and chilling, sources describing Hitler’s
vision for purifying and collecting art. Chief among them is LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE
RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE
SECOND WORLD WAR (1994). See also HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE
NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (Tim Bent &
Hector Feliciano trans., 1997); THE SPOILS OF WAR (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997).
3. See, e.g., Craig Hugh Smyth, The Establishment of the Munich Collecting Point, in
THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 126-30; Rebecca L. Garrett, Time for a Change?
Restoring Nazi-Looted Artwork to its Rightful Owners, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 367, 37072 (2000).
Within two weeks of the German surrender, General Eisenhower, as Supreme
Commander of Allied Forces, issued orders establishing collecting points for looted art.
Munich was chosen as one of the Central Collecting Points (CCP), and it was originally
conceived to be a storage facility. However, its scope quickly included “de facto
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fallout from the art looting remains unfinished, as owners and heirs of
owners continue to search for and sometimes find their missing works.4
Aided by technology and international arts organizations, newly released
public records, and changing attitudes for a restorative justice, when
looted art is located today, the work’s return to the original owner from
the current owner is no longer a linear administrative matter. Time has
rendered the process a private legal one, sometimes with governmental
or political overtones. In the emotionally charged and exceedingly
contentious legal sphere, the expectations of legitimate ownership rights
of each of the innocent parties collide. This impossible triangle of thief,
owner, and innocent buyer—described centuries ago—remains.5
Having one’s day in court is central to our legal system. As in most
litigation, the parties in looted art cases often end the legal challenge
with a privately negotiated settlement.6 The pressure to settle is
responsibility for repatriation.” Craig Hugh Smyth, The Establishment of the Munich
Collecting Point, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 2, at 129.
When accredited representatives of looted countries were invited to have
offices in the Collecting Point and to document, with the help of staff, the
ownership of objects, in order to prove they were from their countries, the
officer-in-charge had to rule on whether the documentation was sufficient for
an object to be released for repatriation—easy to do at the start for the Ghent
Altarpiece (fig. 64) or Michelangelo’s Bruges Madonna (fig. 65). Other
shipments were less spectacular. The difficult problems arose [later].
Id.
When the last Director of the Munich CCP arrived, he found that:
[W]ork at the Munich CCP continued in its orderly routine. Lists were
reviewed and checked against claims and works in storage. New claimants
were directed to make very specific descriptions of what they had lost, when,
and how. Appointed representatives of the nations occupied by Germany
(especially France, the Netherlands, and Belgium) assisted in the process.
When a work had been identified as having come from such a nation after the
date of occupation, it was returned to the government of that nation. To that
source, the owner could then make a claim for restitution.
S. Lane Faison, Jr., Transfer of Custody to the Germans, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra
note 2, at 140 (italics in original).
In the case of DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the court
recounts how Mrs. DeWeerth unsuccessfully reported her Monet’s disappearance to the
military government for the Bonn-Cologne area after the war.
4. See, e.g., Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5862 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005) (discussing recent allegations against actress
Elizabeth Taylor); Dutch to Return Nazi-Seized Paintings to Heir, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7,
2006, at A11.
5. See, e.g., Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory
of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 95 (1991).
6. Michael J. Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading with the Enemy:
Holocaust Restitution, the United States Government, and American Industry, 28
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understandable in all cases, but especially so when the ownership of a
unique work of art is in question; a Solomonic judgment is just not
viable.7 Commentators have urged the formation of new specialized
commissions and rules for these disputes to streamline the process, to
bring a measure of uniformity and predictability, and thereby to calm the
chaos of a worldwide art market.8
Beyond the emotionally draining pull of any dispute, many publicized
cases involve property worth significant amounts, often millions of
dollars.9 This monetary dimension can make prompt resolution of
claims unlikely. Continuing emergence of disputes over Nazi-looted art
coupled with the strong desire and policy to resolve these disputes
between the two innocents, leads to examining all potentially productive
strategies including tax. Tax is not a neat and tidy doctrinal solution,
rather the appeal of tax as a strategy to assist in resolving disputed art
cases lies in its pragmatic and familiar everyman nature. The United
States income tax system routinely balances dynamic and competing
policies, such as revenue raising, economic stimulation, and horizontal
and vertical equity, that often yield to normative concerns.10 Tax
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 683, 711 (2003); Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and
Should Be Done, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 659-61 (1998); infra Part III (discussing
Greece v. Ward and Goodman v. Searle).
7. King Solomon’s order to cut the baby in half revealed the true mother—and
King Solomon’s wisdom. 1 Kings 3:16-:28 (King James). A similar order today to cut
the art in half would, of course, destroy the art without revealing the “true” owner. What
if a judge, however, were able to cut the legal ownership in half, and not the art? Each of
the two innocent parties could conceivably be declared the owner of an undivided onehalf interest in the work of art. Undivided co-ownership interests are common in real
property and partnerships; there is no theoretical reason why co-ownership interest in art
could not exist. Practical concerns such as possession schedules and insurance could
hamper such a resolution, but such concerns are not insurmountable.
An increasingly common technique in gifting valuable works of art (especially to
museums but also to one’s children or heirs) is to create undivided fractional ownership
interests. This allows a taxpayer to transfer an interest in the work to a charity and stay
within the quantitative limitations of the charitable deduction for income tax purposes.
See Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Big Picture, Fine Print: The Intersection of Art and Tax, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 179, 193-96 (2003); Rachel Emma Silverman, Joint Custody for
Your Monet, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2005, at D1.
8. Rebecca Keim, Filling the Gap Between Morality and Jurisprudence: The Use
of Binding Arbitration to Resolve Claims of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen Art, 3
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 295 (2003); Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the
Role of the Museum: A Proposed Solution to Disputes over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 15 (1998); Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to
Resolve Disputes Related to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War II, 10
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 27 (1999).
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.
10. The deduction for home mortgage interest is but one example. See, e.g., Roberta F.
Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and
Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).
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provides a structure amenable to striking balances as perceptions and
impact shift over time. Equally important for the individuals involved,
the tax structure would not require a determination of wrongdoing or
wrongful conduct on the part of either of the two innocents.
This Article will examine ways in which the tax code can be used in
fashioning settlements between individuals over disputed Nazi-looted
art.11 Part II provides an overview of Nazi-era art looting. Part III
examines the income tax charitable deduction as a tool in settling
disputes. Part IV explores the theft loss deduction as a possible tool in
crafting settlements. Part V discusses the policy ramifications of using
the tax code to resolve these private art disputes and proposes allowing a
theft loss deduction when Nazi-looted art is returned to the owner.
II. NAZI LOOTING OF ART
When Adolf Hitler came to power, his “revolution [was not] only
political and economic. It [was] above all cultural.”12 This cultural
11. The primary focus of this Article is on art ownership controversies between
individuals—not disputes involving an ownership claim of a sovereign government.
This is not because government claims are less contentious (consider the
Elgin/Parthenon marbles controversy), rather, the obvious differences of history,
resources, and intergovernmental foreign relations can skew discussion. See Hugh
Eakin, Italy Goes on the Offensive with Antiquities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at E1.
No discussion of contested ownership of cultural property can ignore the
Elgin/Parthenon marbles dispute; it is undoubtedly the prime example of the difficulty of
these cases. Between 1801 and 1812, Lord Elgin removed many of the remaining
marble statues from the ruins of the Parthenon on the Acropolis in Athens and sent them
to London. See, e.g., John Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1881 (1985). In 1816, he sold them to the British Museum, where they remain
housed and known as the “The Elgin Marbles.” Id. From the beginning, there was
controversy in England and Greece over the proper ownership of these marbles. Id. In
1983, the Greek government formally requested the return of the “Parthenon marbles,”
and in 1984, the British government formally rejected the Greek claim to the “Elgin
marbles.” Id.
The controversy continues today, two hundred years after the removal, and is perhaps
even intensifying as cultural property and its role in society emerges as an extremely
important topic in the academy and the popular press. See, e.g., Christine K. Knox,
They’ve Lost Their Marbles: 2002 Universal Museum Declaration, The Elgin Marbles
and the Future of the Repatriation Movement, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 315
(2006).
12. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 6, quoting from a speech of the director of the
Combat League for German Culture in 1933. That speech continued:
[A]lready it has uncovered long hidden sources of German folkways, has
opened paths to that new . . . awareness that all the expressions of life spring
from a specific blood . . . a specific race! . . . Art is not international. . . . If
anyone should ask: What is left of freedom? he will be answered: there is no
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prong initially manifested itself in the 1930s with a purification of art;
that is, the elevation of Hitler’s preferred romantic Germanic art and a
purging of modern, degenerate art from German museums.13 When the
Nazi revolution moved beyond Germany to the invasion of other
countries, the art looting similarly escalated, accompanied by an
increasingly blatant anti-Semitism and a renewed nationalism. The
private art collections owned by Jewish families in Austria, for example,
were expropriated almost immediately after the Austrian Anschlus
invasion in 1938,14 and the great collections of Jewish families in France
were systematically tracked down and confiscated. Art treasures held in
museums, churches, or private collections that had been previously
“plundered” from Germans were to be repatriated to Germany in
accordance with lists drawn up in advance of military operations.15 As
military operations became more widespread, so did the looting of art.
But even by early summer 1939, the sheer amount of confiscated and
safeguarded art was overwhelming. Order needed to be imposed. Hitler
authorized Hans Posse to “build up the new art museum” for his
hometown of Linz.16 The priorities were straightforward: the Fuhrer
Reserve had first choice among the looted works, then German museums
could make selections, finally the remainder was sold at auctions or
through dealers.17

Id.

freedom for those who would weaken and destroy German art . . . there must
be no remorse and no sentimentality in uprooting and crushing what was
destroying our vitals.

13. See id. at 3-6 for a description of a 1939 auction of degenerate art from
German museums’ collections of Picasso, Van Gogh, Klee, Braque, Matisse, Kokoschka,
and others.
14. Id. at 38. See, for example, FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 24-46, for a
description of the “Exemplary Looting of the Rothschild Collections.”
15. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 24-26.
Already sketched out in Hitler’s writings was a plan to repatriate works of art
taken from Germany and dispersed throughout the world. . . . Hitler [ordered] the
eminent art historian Otto Kümmel . . . . to compile an exhaustive list of German
art held in foreign countries since the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Kümmel’s research culminated in three volumes . . . . Their vast work
remained a secret for the entirety of the war.
[T]he Kümmel Report overlooked nothing. . . . What was essential was that
the German people had been geraubt, despoiled, of their heritage . . . . But the
report’s demands also had a historical significance that went deep into the
German nationalism: They were to erase the humiliation of the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919, which ended World War I, and to restore to German culture
the central place that Nazis thought was its birthright.
Id. (emphasis in original).
16. NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 44.
17. Id. at 45. In practice, however, after Hitler made his choices, Hermann
Goering, working through the ERR, made his selections for his personal art collection to
be housed at his estate, Carinhall. See, e.g., FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 31-40.
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Hitler, of course, did not invent the wartime looting of art works.18
Yet the breathtaking scope of the Nazi plunder, its systematic approach,
and involvement at the highest levels was unmatched in history. Even
sixty years later, we do not know all that was taken, who took it, its
continued existence or its whereabouts.19 What we do know is that
there is worldwide interest in dealing with the issue today.20
18. History affords many examples of victors carrying off the spoils of war. The
Old Testament tells us of the siege of Jerusalem by the Babylonians under King
Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C. and the plunder of Solomon’s temple: “[T]he bowls, and
the cauldrons, and the candlesticks, and the spoons, and the cups; that which was of gold
in gold and that which was of silver in silver, took the captain of the guard away.”
Jeremia 52:19 (King James). The Arch of Titus in the Roman Forum was erected in
A.D. 81 to commemorate the victory of Titus in Jerusalem. One relief in particular
shows rather vividly the victors displaying their plunder, including a Menorah from
Herod’s Temple. See generally Jeanette Greenfield, The Spoils of War, in THE SPOILS OF
WAR, supra note 2, at 34-38. The exquisite four horses of San Marco in Venice were
taken by the Crusaders from the Hippodrome during the sack of Constantinople in 1204.
Six centuries later, these very same horses were taken by Napoleon in 1797 and paraded
triumphantly in Paris in 1798. After Napoleon’s military defeats in 1814 and 1815, the
four horses were returned to San Marco through the Convention of Paris in 1815.
During World War II, these horses were removed for safekeeping. Today the original
four horses are inside San Marco and copies stand in the facade. Id.
Nor is it likely that art looting is of historic interest only. See Amy E. Miller, The
Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn Away Leisurely from the Disaster,
37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 49 (2005) (arguing the United States is liable for a breach of
international law by allowing art looting in Iraq).
19. Estimates as to the amount of plunder of works of art during the war vary
considerably. For example, one estimate is that one-fifth of all Western art was seized
by the Nazis. Kaye, supra note 6, at 657. Another is that 220,000 works of art, valued at
$2.5 billion in 1945 and $20.5 billion in 2003 were seized. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra
note 6, at 709. Another estimate indicates “600,000 important works” were seized while
“[a]s many as 100,000 pieces are still . . . missing.” Ralph Blumenthal, New Efforts to
Recover Nazi Plunder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at E1. Most likely, “[t]he total amount of
loot will never be known; it has proved beyond man’s capacity to accurately compute.”
WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 943 (1960).
The stereotype of official impeccable German recordkeeping only goes so far. Even
good records are lost, have misattributions, and contain inaccurate information.
Additionly, personal human greed plays a role. Unauthorized and unofficial takings of
others’ property by officials, neighbors, and others were commonplace. Some property
demonstrably taken by Germany was later “restituted” as reparations to the Soviet
Union, sometimes officially, sometimes not. See, e.g., Margaret M. Mastroberardino,
The Last Prisoners of World War II, 9 PACE INT’L L. REV. 315 (1997); Silvia L. Depta,
Comment, Twice Saved or Twice Stolen?: The Trophy Art Tug-of-War Between Russia
and Germany, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 371 (1996).
20. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 710.
The worldwide movement to recover Nazi-looted art also has its roots in the
United States. In late 1998, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum hosted the Washington Conference on
Holocaust-Era Assets at the U.S. Department of State. Forty-four governments, as
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III. CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
The charitable deduction has been part of the federal income tax
system since 1917.21 While there have been periodic reforms to section
170 over time, the basic outline has remained fairly constant for most
taxpayers: donations by taxpayers to qualified charities can qualify for
an income tax deduction. However, once the charitable gift moves from
a monetary one to a work of art, qualitative and quantitative statutory
and regulatory requirements become extremely demanding.22 Despite
the complexity, there are two variations where buyers in disputed art
cases have successfully used the charitable deduction in fashioning a
settlement. One involved stolen antiquities returned to the Greek
government using a U.S. charity as a conduit; the other involved the
transfer of a Nazi-looted work of art to a U.S. museum.
A. Greece v. Ward: Mycenaean Treasure from Aidonia
In April 1993, the Michael Ward Gallery, a prominent antiquities
gallery in New York, announced a show entitled “Gold of the Mycenaeans,”
featuring a rare collection of Greek antiquities dating from the 15th
century BC.23 The exhibition catalogue showed a collection of gold
jewelry and artifacts, with the collection’s price set at $1,500,000. The
well as numerous international non-governmental organizations, sent
delegations to the conference to deal with Nazi-stolen assets, including artwork
found throughout the world. The conference was designed as an international
effort. . . .
Id. (footnotes omitted). One result of the meeting was the development of a set of
nonbinding principles, the Washington Conference Principles of Nazi-Confiscated Art.
Those principles aim to provide transparency in art provenance and to facilitate the
restitution of Nazi-looted art across many different countries and different legal systems,
a technique that has been called “narrative norms.” Eric Jayme, Globalization in Art
Law: Clash of Interests and International Tendencies, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927,
943 (2005). Although the agreed upon principles are nonbinding, they nevertheless may
impact the law over time as courts are called upon to consider questions of interpretation
and construction of statutes. Id. These norms can and have played a role beyond the
judiciary, as legislatures consider resolutions or new statutes, and the executive branch
takes action. See infra note 77. Moreover, many museums have now fashioned
proactive statements on provenance. See, e.g., American Association of Museums,
Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era
(1999), http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/upload/ethicsguidelines_naziera.pdf.
21. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (Supp. 2001). The charitable deduction debuted in a tax bill
that raised tax rates to help finance the cost of America’s entry into World War I. The
concern then as now was that as income tax rates would rise, donations to charities
would fall. “Now, when war comes and we impose these very heavy taxes on incomes,
that will be the first place where the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely,
in donations to charity.” 55 CONG. REC. 65, 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
22. See RALPH LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1554-1604 (3d ed. 2005).
23. Emily C. Ehl, Comment, The Settlement of Greece v. Ward: Who Loses?, 78
B.U. L. REV. 661, 674 (1998).
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collection was stunning, not only for its obvious aesthetic value, but to
some antiquities experts, for its obvious similarity to looted Mycenaean
cemetery treasures from Aidonia.24 The government of Greece, having
reviewed the catalogue, contacted the Ward Gallery to demand the
return of its cultural property. The demand was unsuccessful. Within
two weeks of the rejection, Greece filed a lawsuit in the Southern
District of New York requesting that the sale be enjoined and that
Greece be declared the owner of the collection.25 For seven months,
negotiations continued on the case.
Michael Ward, the Director of the Ward Gallery, was a prominent
scholar-dealer and a member of a U.S. presidential panel concerning art
smuggling.26 He was determined to end the controversy without further
litigation.27 A direct transfer of the disputed collection to Greece would
certainly have done so, but instead the dispute created a triangulation of
ownership interests.
The Society for the Preservation of the Greek Heritage, a Washington
based 501(c)(3) charity, agreed to accept the donation of the collection
from the Ward Gallery, and the Greek government simultaneously
agreed to drop its claim against the Ward Gallery.28 The charitable
deduction under the Internal Revenue Code served as the critical link.
For a transfer of property to a recognized public charity, the Ward
Gallery could deduct the donation of the tangible personal property as
long as the use of the tangible property was related to the charity’s
purposes.29 The Gallery would need to ascertain that the charity did not
24. Ricardo J. Elia, Greece v. Ward: The Return of Mycenaean Artifacts, 4 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 119, 121 n.17 (1995); see also Mary Williams Walsh, A Grecian
Treasure: Back from the Grave?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at A1 (“When American
experts familiar with the late Grecian Bronze Age saw a photo of the sale pieces
accompanying a report on the upcoming auction in the New York Times, they could not
believe their eyes.”).
25. Greece v. Ward, No. 93 Civ. 3493 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1993).
26. Elia, supra note 24, at 120, 124 (“The irony that the gallery director is a
member of . . . a presidential committee . . . was widely noted . . . .”); see also Walsh
supra note 24 (“Ward’s prominence in the cultural preservation world [was a factor in
favor of Greece’s claim]. No ordinary gallery owner, he had a strong scholarly interest
and sat on the U.S. Cultural Property Advisory Committee . . . . ‘It was a very difficult
position for Mr. Ward,’ [the director of antiquities for Greek Ministry of culture] said.”).
27. Norman Hammond, Looted Gold Goes Back to Greece, TIMES (London), Jan.
20, 1994, at 20.
28. Elia, supra note 24, at 122.
29. Because of Ward’s status as a dealer with respect to the Mycenaean antiquities
(and not as a collector), the deduction would be limited to the taxpayer’s basis, and not
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intend to sell the property or put it to an unrelated use. What was that
intended use? It was to transfer the property back to Greece. By
triangulating the transfer through a conduit charity, Mr. Ward and the
Greek government were able to settle their controversy.
B. Goodman v. Searle: Landscape with Smokestacks
Daniel C. Searle purchased a Degas pastel-over-monotype, Landscape
with Smokestacks, for $850,000 in July 1987.30 A member of the Art
Institute of Chicago’s Board of Trustees, Mr. Searle, was informed by
the Art Institute of the availability of the Degas and its desirability.31
But for a lack of acquisition funds, the Art Institute itself would have
purchased the Degas.32 The Art Institute made arrangements for Mr.
Searle to view the Degas at the apartment of its then current owner in
New York; at Mr. Searle’s request, the landscape was sent to the Art
Institute for inspection.33 It was given a “clean bill of health.”34 Seven
years after his purchase, Mr. Searle loaned the Degas to the Metropolitan
Museum of Art in New York for an exhibition. Grandsons of Friedrich
and Louise Gutmann, who were killed in the Holocaust, saw the
catalogue for the exhibition and recognized the work as one that had
the fair market value. 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)(I)(A) (Supp. 2001). Ward’s cost was reportedly
$150,000. See Hammond, supra note 27; Walsh, supra note 24.
30. HOWARD J. TRIENENS, LANDSCAPE WITH SMOKESTACKS 11 (2000). Mr. Trienens
was counsel for Mr. Searle, the defendant collector. Id. at XIV. One reason he wrote the
book was his belief that the media oversimplified the story. Id.
As reported by the media, the story is straightforward. . . .
As the facts emerged in the course of litigation, however, the straightforward
media story turned out to be complex. . . .
....
This book’s purpose is not to solve the mystery of what actually happened to
the landscape. Rather, the purpose is to describe what lies beneath the surface
of the press reports and television programs. This provides a more intriguing,
if more ambiguous, story.
As what is known of the story of Landscape with Smokestacks is revealed,
genuine questions emerge about the capacity of our judicial system to deal
with cases of this kind and, perhaps more significantly, the performance of the
media in such an emotionally charged atmosphere.
Id. at XIII-XIV.
Thomas R. Kline of Washington D.C. represented the Gutmann family. When the
case was transferred to Chicago, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd. became local counsel for the
Gutmann family. I, Anne-Marie Rhodes, was then and remain now as Of Counsel at
Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd. Although not directly involved, I was certainly aware of the
case. I cite Mr. Trienen’s book primarily because it is well-written and germane, but
also because like Mr. Trienens, it might be difficult for me to “escape the charge that
[this] is slanted in [the client’s] favor . . . .” Id. at XIV.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 11.
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belonged to their grandparents.35 With their aunt Lili Gutmann, Nick
and Simon Goodman sued Daniel Searle in July 1996, for the return of
the Degas.36 The controversy was highly publicized by both print and
broadcast media.37 The value of the Degas was estimated to be
$1,100,000.38 On the eve of trial in summer 1998, the parties settled
their litigation.39 The charitable deduction played a role.
The settlement agreement provided that each of Lili Gutmann, Nick
Goodman, Simon Goodman, and Daniel Searle would transfer her or his
ownership interest in the Degas to the Art Institute of Chicago.40 Daniel
Searle’s transfer would be a gift of his interest; the Gutmann family
transfers would be sales. The total sales price would be one-half of the
then fair market value of the Degas. Fair market value would be the
average of two independently prepared appraisals. One of the appraisers
would be chosen by the Gutmann family from a list of individual
appraisers prepared by the Art Institute; the other appraiser, also to be
chosen by the Gutmann family, would be Christie’s or Sotheby’s. The
Gutmanns chose Richard Feigen and Christie’s.41
In November 1998, the Art Institute informed the parties that Mr.
Feigen had appraised the Degas at $575,000, while Christie’s had
appraised it at $300,000.42 The average therefore was $437,500, one
half of which is $218,750. Mr. Searle would use these appraisals in
preparing his income tax return and claiming a charitable deduction for
his one-half interest valued at $218,750. Disappointed with the
appraisals, the Gutmanns did not accept the Art Institute’s tender of the
$218,750 in payment for their collective one-half interest; instead, the
35. Id. at 15; see also Hector Feliciano et al., Nazi-Stolen Art, 20 WHITTIER L. REV.
67, 89 (1998) (“Now, my brother and I started looking everywhere. . . . Pretty quickly we
found the Degas landscape . . . . It was in an exhibit in the Metropolitan Museum of Art
in New York in 1994 and was . . . owned by Daniel Searle.”).
36. TRIENENS, supra note 30, at 28-34; see also Goodman v. Searle, No. 96 CV
5310 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1996), transferred to No. 96 C6459 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Except
when referring to specific individuals, this Article will refer to the Gutmann (and not the
Goodman) family, using the common ancestral name.
37. TRIENENS, supra note 30, at 28-34. Print media included articles in the Los
Angeles Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Boston Globe, ARTNews,
and Chicago Magazine. The story was broadcast on National Public Radio, the CBS
program 60 Minutes, and on public television. Id.
38. Id. at 12.
39. Id. at 86, 93.
40. Id. at 93-94.
41. Id. at 94.
42. Id. at 94-95.
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Gutmanns requested a reappraisal.43 Mr. Feigen did not revise his
valuation, but in April 1999, Christie’s raised its valuation by $100,000
in light of a November 1998 sale of another Degas pastel. The new
average therefore was $487,500, one-half of which, $243,750, the Art
Institute paid to the Gutmann family for their ownership interests.44 Mr.
Searle was able therefore to claim an amount $25,000 higher as a
charitable deduction on his income tax return. By each side recognizing
at some level an ownership interest of the other, and then by both
triangulating their interests to create ownership in a new third party, the
dispute was resolved. Today, Landscape with Smokestacks hangs in the
Art Institute with a plaque reflecting its prior dual ownership, a
“purchase from the collection of Fritz and Louise Gutmann and a gift of
Daniel C. Searle.”45
Mr. Searle paid $850,000 for the Degas in 1987 and received a
$243,750 charitable deduction for the transfer of his ownership interest
in 1998 to the Art Institute. Mr. Searle clearly suffered an economic
loss. Was another tax approach available?
IV. THEFT LOSS DEDUCTION
Internal Revenue Code section 165(a) provides a general deduction for
losses sustained in a taxable year, with subsection (c)(3) restricting
individual taxpayers’ personal, non-business losses to those arising from
“fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”46 No statutory
definition of theft exists; the regulations provide merely that theft is
“deemed to include, but shall not necessarily be limited to, larceny,
embezzlement, and robbery.”47 Cases and rulings under section 165(c)(3)
nevertheless have drawn a tight line as to what constitutes a theft and
routinely distinguish theft losses from other losses, with the two
elements of criminality and timing having particular prominence and
relevance.
To claim a theft loss, a taxpayer first must prove an illegal, wrongful
taking, not just that the property is missing.48 In the textbook case
43. Nick Goodman had been quoted as saying he was “looking for a value of about
$1 million.” Id. at 95.
44. Id. at 95-96.
45. Ron Grossman, How a Family’s Degas Traveled from Their Estate to the
Center of Controversy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2001, sec. 7, at 14.
46. 26 U.S.C. § 165 (2000). Other casualty and theft were added to the section in
1916. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759. The 1913 original
enactment of the federal income tax had provided only for “fires, storms, or shipwreck.”
Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 114, 167.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (2005).
48. Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60.
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illustrating theft loss, Mary Frances Allen was not allowed a theft loss
deduction for the loss of her brooch.49 Mrs. Allen had only proven that
she had worn her brooch to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New
York, that it was crowded that day, and that a search at the Metropolitan
did not uncover the brooch. For the majority, that offer of evidence,
although proving a loss, did not prove a loss from theft. The court
reminded observers that not all losses are tax deductible.
Second, the taking must be illegal and done with criminal intent, with
illegality determined under the law of the state where the taking
occurred.50 For thefts of a routine nature, say auto thefts, this is not a
particularly stringent standard. In the context of a foreign country’s
expropriation or nationalization of a taxpayer’s personal property,
however, using the internal law of that country to determine illegality
seldom yields a deduction for the taxpayer.51 The Farcasanu case
discussed below illustrates the harsh application of the theft loss
deduction in the context of foreign expropriation of private property, and
reflects the chaos of the 1940’s especially well.52
A. Farcasanu, Foreign Expropriation, and the Act of State Doctrine
Mrs. Farcasanu was the wife of the U.S. Minister to Rumania in 1937,
and as was then customary, she and her husband furnished their living
quarters with their own property including rare and valuable furniture,
antiquities, and art.53 Eleven days after Rumania declared war on the
United States in December 1941, Mrs. Farcasanu’s husband died from
leukemia. She was forced to flee Bucharest in such great haste that she
even had to leave her deceased husband’s remains in Rumania.
By the time Mrs. Farcasanu was first able to return to Rumania in
November 1945, the Communists were in control. Though she wished
to leave, the head of the American Mission persuaded her to stay,
49. Allen v. Comm’r, 16 T.C. 163 (1951).
50. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956); see also Martin J.
McMahon, Annotation, What Constitutes Tax Deductible Theft Loss Under 26 USCS §
165, 98 A.L.R. FED. 229 (1990).
51. Alan Epstein, Note, Foreign Expropriation Losses of Personal Assets: Should
a Deduction be Allowed Under Internal Revenue Code Section 165(c)(3)?, 40 TAX LAW.
211, 231 (1986).
52. Farcasanu v. Comm’r, 436 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1970), aff’g 50 T.C. 881
(1968). The summary of facts is drawn from the court’s opinion and will generally not
be footnoted separately.
53. Id.
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viewing her personal connections to the royal family as an important
political advantage. In early 1947, Mrs. Farcasanu once again returned
to the United States in great haste due to a family emergency. Mrs.
Farcasanu requested the State Department to ship her property back to
America, but it declined for fear of antagonizing the Rumanian
government. Thereafter, Mrs. Farcasanu’s personal property was nationalized
by the Rumanian government.
In 1956, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission awarded Mrs.
Farcasanu $103,445 of her requested $295,716. When it appeared that
no additional compensation would be forthcoming, Mrs. Farcasanu
claimed a theft loss deduction on her 1959 income tax return. The Tax
Court upheld the Service’s denial of the deduction.54
In a per curiam opinion affirming the denial, the court of appeals
acknowledged that theft under section 165 is “defined broadly,” but also
that theft must be determined under the law of the situs of the taking,
and always requires a criminal intent.55 In cases of foreign expropriation
of private property, the court noted that cases have drawn a “sharp
distinction . . . between takings . . . made under color of governmental
authority, and takings . . . in clear violation of the commands of the
sovereign.”56 As long as the confiscating official acted under “color of
legal authority, arbitrary and despotic as it may have been,” there can be
no “theft for tax deduction purposes.”57
Farcasanu gives active tax support to the Act of State doctrine that:
[T]he Judicial Branch [of the United States government] will not examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government extant and recognized by the country at the time of the suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law.58

54. Farcasanu, 50 T.C. 881 (1968).
55. Farcasanu, 436 F.2d at 149.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). It is beyond
the scope of this Article to delve deeply into the highly complex and porous Act of State
doctrine. It is important to note, however, the Supreme Court held in 2004 that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not prohibit Maria Altmann, the niece and heir of
a prominent Jewish art collector, from pursuing a private cause of action in the United
States federal court system against the Austrian government for the return of six Gustav
Klimt paintings that had belonged to her family before the Nazi takeover. Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004). On January 15, 2006, an Austrian arbitration
panel determined that the Klimts were wrongfully acquired by the Austrian museum and
ordered their return to the family. “Austrian Arbitration Court: Maria Altmann and Dr.
Neil Averspurg versus the Republic of Austria,” American Society of International Law,
http://www.asil.org/ilib/2006/03/ilib06031.htm#j5 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). The paintings
arrived shortly thereafter in Los Angeles, “a dream come true” for Maria Altmann. Daisy
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Hence, the court believed the Act of State doctrine precluded it from
evaluating the expropriation as a theft.
Despite this harsh precedent denying a theft loss deduction for foreign
expropriation, the Act of State doctrine may not necessarily foreclose a
theft deduction when Nazi-looted art is returned to the original owner.
First, one may argue the doctrine itself was inappropriately incorporated
into the tax system.59 Simply put, a deduction by a taxpayer under the
Internal Revenue Code does not interfere with the President’s ability to
set foreign policy, involve the U.S. Government in the internal affairs of
a sovereign state, or pose a threat to that sovereign’s assets. The realm
of the doctrine is international diplomacy, not the Form 1040. Second,
even if the Act of State doctrine is relevant to the Code, the facts of a
particular case may negate its application.

Nguyen, Inheritor of Stolen Klimts Welcomes Paintings to L.A., CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2006,
sec. 1, at 6. By June 2006, the magnificent portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I by Klimt had
been sold by the heirs, reportedly for a record $135 million, to the Neue Galerie in New
York. The Neue Galerie is a museum specializing in Austrian and German art and the
subject of its famous acquisition has been described by Ronald S. Lauder, a founder of
the museum, as “our Mona Lisa.” Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135 Million, a Record, for
a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at E1.
It would indeed be ironic if the Act of State doctrine, which does not now prevent a
private cause of action against a foreign government from proceeding in the United
States, continues to prohibit a U.S. taxpayer from claiming a theft loss deduction for
income tax purposes.
59. Epstein, supra note 51, at 228-30.
Unfortunately, the courts have indiscriminately incorporated the Act of State
doctrine into the law of federal income taxation without expressing any
substantive reasons to support this incorporation. In fact, the doctrine’s
adoption partially appears to be the product of trial tactics. . . . Farcasanu filed
several motions for a continuance based on her concession “that the case of
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino then pending before the Supreme Court
was ‘controlling on the issue of whether “nationalization” is a “theft”‘ for the
purpose of a deduction for theft loss. . .” Because Sabbatino held that an
American court could not characterize an expropriatory act as a theft, the Tax
Court logically concluded that Farcasanu’s loss not deductible.
....
The declaration of the confiscatory act as a “theft” solely for purposes of
federal income taxation should not interfere with international relations
because it does not require the imposition of Western ideologies upon nonWestern nations. The expropriating nation will not be affected by this
characterization . . . .
Id. at 228-29 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Menzel, Facts, and the Act of State Doctrine
Almost forty years ago in a private ownership dispute case, a New
York court determined that the seizure by the ERR of a privately owned
Chagall painting was an act of plunder or pillage under international and
military law, and therefore not lawful.60 Mr. and Mrs. Menzel lived in
Brussels until March 1941 when they fled from the oncoming Nazis.
They had hurriedly left their apartment and its furnishings, including a
painting by Marc Chagall. Treating this as “decadent Jewish art,” the
painting, along with other works of art, was seized and a receipt was left
by the ERR indicating the property was taken for “safekeeping.”61 After
the war, the Menzels searched for the painting unsuccessfully until 1962
when it was located in the possession of the defendant List, who had
purchased the painting in good faith in 1955. Mrs. Menzel (Mr. Menzel
having died) brought a replevin suit to recover the painting. A jury
returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Menzel finding that the painting
belonged unqualifiedly to Mrs. Menzel, and that it was looted and stolen
from her apartment.
On a motion to set aside the verdict, the court determined the seizure
was not lawful and the Act of State doctrine did not apply to preclude
the court’s inquiry into the validity of acts of the Nazis.62 The court
carefully considered the four factors necessary for the Act of State
doctrine to apply, and held that none of the four was met.
The first factor is that the taking must be by a foreign sovereign
government. In the Menzel case, the Chagall was taken by the ERR,
determined by the court to be an organ of the Nazi party and not a
foreign sovereign government.63 Second, the taking must be within the
territory of the foreign government. Assuming arguendo that the taking
was by Germany, the Chagall was taken from the Menzel’s residence in
Brussels in 1941. German military occupation did not make Brussels
part of Germany; the Kingdom of Belgium was the recognized
government of Belgium, though in exile.64 Third, the foreign government
must be extant and recognized by the United States at the time of the
suit. The Third Reich had collapsed with its surrender in 1945 and,
therefore, was not in existence when Mrs. Menzel filed her lawsuit.65
60. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1966).
61. Id. at 806.
62. Id. at 812. In doing so, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
63. Id. at 813-15.
64. Id. at 815-16.
65. Id. at 816.
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Fourth, the taking must not violate any treaty obligation. Belgium,
Germany, and the United States all signed the 1907 Hague Convention
Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land. That convention
formally forbade pillage. The court noted that the “pillage so rampant
during the Nazi occupation was specifically held to be in violation” of
the 1907 Hague Convention by the Nuremberg trials.66 For many Nazilooted art disputes, some, if not all four, of these factors will be similar.
C. Divining Congressional Intent on Foreign Expropriation
The Farcasanu court had another reason supporting its application of
the Act of State doctrine to bar a theft loss deduction. In 1964, Congress
added new section 165(i), since repealed, to specifically allow a
deduction for losses arising from the confiscation of nonbusiness
property by the Cuban government between 1958 and 1964.67 These
were to be treated as losses “to which paragraph (3) of subsection (c)
applies.”68 No Committee Report discusses this new subsection, as it
was added as an amendment from the Senate floor. The Conference
Report merely states that such losses shall be treated as losses from
“other casualty.”69 For the Tax Court, this enactment removed “any doubt”
as to congressional intent and understanding as to the scope of theft
under section 165(c)(3) for foreign expropriation.70
It is possible, however, that section 165(i) had more grounding in the
practical politics of the Cold War era than in tax doctrine. Cuba’s
proximity to the United States may have increased the number of U.S.
taxpayers, and hence voters, directly affected by Castro’s nationalization.
Section 165(i) could have been added to smooth the way for taxpayers’
Cuban claims, for by declaring Cuban expropriation losses to be
statutorily deductible, individual taxpayers would not bear the burden of
66. Id. at 817.
67. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 238, 78 Stat. 19, 128, repealed by
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(26), 90 Stat. 1520, 1767.
68. Id. For a brief history of former section 165(i), see also Ogden v. United
States, 432 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff’d 555 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1977).
69. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1149 (1964) (Conf. Rept.), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1940, 1992; see also Rev. Rul. 65-87, 1965-1 C.B. 111 (“[A]ny loss of
property (not used in a trade or business or for income-producing purposes) resulting
from expropriation . . . by the Government of Cuba . . . is treated as a loss from a
casualty within the meaning of section 165(c)(3) of the Code . . . .”).
70. Farcasanu v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 881, 890 (1968), aff’d, 436 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
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proving “other casualty.”71 That Congress took specific action in the
instance of Cuban expropriation apparently deeming it an “other
casualty,” does not logically mean an individual taxpayer is foreclosed
from proving a theft in another context.
Even if Farcasanu was correct in its perception of congressional
policy on expropriation for tax purposes, does it remain defining for the
still reverberating Nazi-looted art? Section 803 of the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, another enactment with scant
legislative history, may provide a fresher perspective on congressional
intent. Under that section, payments received by an eligible U.S. taxpayer
as restitution arising from the Holocaust are excluded from gross income
for federal income tax purposes.72 Section 803 reflects the principles of
the late 1998 international conference convened by the United States
concerning Nazi-era assets, including Swiss bank accounts, insurance, and
other corporate transactions.73 As a result of this United States led
initiative, over $8 billion has been paid to Holocaust survivors, their
heirs, and charitable organizations.74
Normally, gross income includes interest, dividends, and any gains
derived from dealings in property, but does not include a mere return of
one’s original property. To the extent, therefore, that restitution payments
include as a measure of restitution amounts for the interest, dividends,
and gains beyond one’s actual original property, there would be income
for tax purposes absent section 803. In contrast, the return of the
original property, such as art, would not give rise to income to the
owner. Nevertheless section 803 specifically excludes from gross income
the value of the actual “assets stolen or hidden from, or otherwise lost”
that are returned to the taxpayer.75 This unnecessary overinclusiveness
of the exclusion speaks to its normative, as opposed to fiscal, value. In

71. Epstein, supra note 51, at 220. It is interesting to note that Fidel Castro
appropriated works of art from private collectors that are also now starting to appear on
the world auction market. See Celestine Bohlen, Reclaiming Art Caught in the Cuban
Revolution: In Cases Reminiscent of Looted Nazi Art, Emigres Trace Fate of their
Collections, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, sec. E, col. 2; Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Castro’s
Art Theft Puts Sotheby’s on the Spot, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2004, at A15.
72. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. No. 10716, § 803, 115 Stat. 38, 149 [hereinafter EGTRRA § 803].
73. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
74. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 686-87 (“The United States has been the
prime mover behind the numerous agreements concluded between 1998 and 2001 . . . .
These settlements brought about by the U.S. government and in U.S. courts . . . have
now reached a figure somewhere between $8 to $11 billion . . . .”).
75. EGTRRA § 803.
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the words of its Senate sponsor, “[t]he federal government should not
make one dime on Holocaust restitution, ever.”76
That a transferee does not have income upon the receipt of returned
property does not mean the transferor does or does not have a corresponding
deduction upon the transfer. Symmetry of treatment between two parties
to a transaction is not required by tax policy or practice. Each party is to
account separately for the transaction. Consequently section 803’s nontax impact on the transferee is not decisive on the issue of a transferor’s
deduction. What section 803 does underscore, however, is an articulated
United States policy, including tax, supporting resolution of Nazi-era
claims.77
With this rather elliptical history in mind, can an innocent buyer of
Nazi-looted art now legitimately claim a theft loss deduction when that
work of art must be returned to the heirs? Resolving the two additional
section 165(c)(3) issues of timing and meaning of art theft will be
critical to the decision.
D. Timing
Virtually all theft loss cases pose the situation of the taxpayer as the
direct victim of the thief and the consequent theft; there are no
intermediary transfers. The question of a time delay in a theft scenario
was addressed early in the statute and easily resolved in favor of the
76. 148 CONG. REC. 151, S11796 (2002) (statement of Senator Fitzgerald
regarding the Holocaust Restitution Tax Fairness Act of 2002). The Act removed
EGTRA’s December 31, 2010 sunset provision from application to section 803. Id.
77. Section 202 of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act provides:
It is the sense of Congress that consistent with the 1907 Hague Convention, all
governments should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of
private and public property, such as works of art, to the rightful owners in
cases where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period of
Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof that the claimant is the rightful owner.
Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112 Stat. 15, 17-18 (1998). Judicial reluctance in the United
States to term the Nazi looting of art as theft may be waning. Recently, the Supreme
Court characterized the Nazi regime as engaging “not only in genocide and enslavement
but theft of Jewish assets.” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).
See also Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, stating that “the Nazi regimentation of inhumanity
we characterize as the Holocaust, marked most horrifically by genocide and
enslavement, also entailed widespread destruction, confiscation, and theft of property
belonging to Jews.” Id. at 430. The Nuremberg trials themselves, where criminal
charges over the looting of art were alleged and proven, should not be ignored. See
generally The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946). See also Sue Choi, The Legal
Landscape of the International Art Market After Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 198-99 (2005).
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taxpayer: a theft was deemed sustained for purposes of the deduction
when it was discovered.78 The lapse of time is not, therefore, by
statutory pronouncement, fatal to the deduction. Yet when presented
with a theft loss deduction claimed by an innocent purchaser one or
more sales transactions removed from the thief, the circuits are split, as
illustrated by the following cases.
1. Boothe v. Commissioner
In 1960, Mr. Boothe sold his interest in certain Soldier’s Additional
Homestead Rights, which he had purchased in 1959.79 These rights were
originally granted to certain soldiers who served in the Civil War, and
allowed them to apply for and receive a fee interest in certain federal
lands. These rights were freely assignable. Mr. Boothe’s rights were
traceable to William H. Dooley, Jr., the original grantee, who perfected
his claim in 1873. Twenty-five years later in 1898, Mr. Dooley assigned
all of his rights to claim 120 acres to Mr. Black. Thereafter in 1916, Mr.
Dooley again sold all his rights (in three assignments of forty acres each)
to B.A. Mason. Thirty-five years after his purchase, Mr. Mason sold one
of the forty acre assignments to Mr. Davis in 1951. It was from Mr.
Davis’s estate in 1959 that Mr. Boothe purchased the disputed rights for
$4400. Mr. Boothe attempted to exercise his rights in the State of
Washington, but the land he desired was not available under this
program. Fourteen months later, Mr. Boothe then sold his interest to R.
L. Spoo for $8000, reporting a gain of $3600 on his income tax return.
Mr. Spoo’s designee attempted to exercise the rights on land in Nevada,
but like in Mr. Boothe’s attempt, that land was not available. The
Bureau of Land Management, however, held that the rights were valid.
When a second attempt to exercise the rights was made with respect to
land in Oregon, the Bureau held the rights invalid due to the 1898
assignment to Mr. Black.
Mr. Spoo then sued Mr. Boothe for breach of warranty of title,
recovering a judgment of $20,792 in damages. Mr. Boothe paid the
judgment in 1977 and claimed a theft loss deduction on his income tax
return. The Commissioner denied the theft loss deduction since Mr.
Boothe was not the victim of a theft.
The sole issue before the Tax Court was the characterization of the
$20,792 judgment paid by Mr. Boothe as either a theft loss under section
165(c) or a capital loss under section 165(f).80 The practical difference
78. 26 U.S.C. § 165(e) (2006).
79. Boothe v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 804 (1984), rev’d, 768 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam).
80. Id. at 805.
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is quantitative; that is, for capital losses in excess of capital gains, there
is only a modest deduction allowed,81 whereas a theft loss was at the
time almost wholly deductible.82 Applying the origin of the claim
doctrine, the majority Tax Court opinion supported by ten judges
decided that the 1977 judgment arose from the 1960 sale to Mr. Spoo.83
Hence, under the principle of Arrowsmith, the loss originated in a capital
transaction and was therefore a capital loss.84 It was consequently
unnecessary for the majority to determine if a taxpayer who is not the
direct victim can claim the deduction as a theft loss.85 Two dissenting
opinions supported by eight judges were filed.86
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, in a brief per curiam opinion, noted that
the “unusual facts in this case created sharp differences of opinion . . . .
We agree with and adopt the dissenting opinion of Judge Körner.”87 In
81. 26 U.S.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(b) (1977).
82. As in effect in 1977, a theft loss was allowable as a deduction only to the
extent the loss from each theft exceeded $100. Id. Today there is an additional
quantitative limitation in section 165(h)(2), essentially allowing personal casualty losses
only to the extent such personal casualty losses exceed ten percent of the taxpayer’s
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). See U.S.C. § 165(h)(2) (2006).
83. Boothe, 82 T.C. at 807.
The deductions claimed by petitioners were for a judgment of damages and
court costs. The inquiry as to the character of the deduction should, therefore,
focus upon the nature of the litigation. Where litigation involves the
acquisition or disposition of capital assets, the origin and character of the claim
is the controlling test . . . . Although most of the cases involving this issue
relate to deductibility under section 162 or section 212, there is no reason why
the test should not be applied to a deduction claimed under section 165.
Id. (citations omitted). Judge Hamblen’s dissent offers “several reasons to resist such
expansion.” Id. at 812; see also Edward J. Schnee & Nancy J. Stara, The Origin of the
Claim Test: A Search for Objectivity, 13 AKRON TAX J. 97, 119-21 (1997).
84. “In Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) . . . . [t]he Supreme Court held
that the payments by the taxpayers were allowable only as capital losses because they
arose from the earlier capital transaction. We conclude that the principle of Arrowsmith
applies here.” Boothe, 82 T.C. at 808.
85. “In view of our holding based upon the origin-of-the-claim test, it is
unnecessary for us to decide whether a taxpayer who is not the direct victim of a theft is
entitled to deduct a theft loss.” Id. at 809.
86. Judge Körner’s dissent (discussed infra) was joined only by Judge Whitaker.
Id. at 812. Judge Hamblen’s dissent was joined by five Tax Court Judges. Id. at 819.
Judge Hamblen’s dissent first rejects the “expansion” of the origin of the claim test to
section 165, then addresses the “principal question now sidestepped by the majority” and
resolves “the victim proximity issue” in the taxpayer’s favor. Id. at 812.
87. Boothe v. Comm’r, 768 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The
sharpest difference was between the ten judge majority opinion (which viewed the case
wholly through an origin of the claim prism) and Judge Hamblen’s six judge dissent (which
viewed the case wholly through a theft loss prism). See Schnee & Stara, supra note 83.
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his dissenting opinion in the Tax Court, Judge Körner viewed the case as
involving two distinct and separate events.88 The first was a theft “even
though (Boothe) was not the immediate purchaser from the fraudulent
vendor.”89 This theft occurred in 1959 when Mr. Boothe purchased his
interest, but it was discovered by the taxpayer only when litigation was
concluded in 1977, and thus deductible in 1977.90 Under section 165(b),
the basis for determining the amount of any loss is the adjusted basis of
the property. Consequently, Mr. Boothe’s theft loss was his basis, or
$4400. The second event concerned the remaining $16,392 in damages,
proceeding from the breach of warranty of title lawsuit. Judge Körner
agreed with the majority’s origin of the claim analysis sustaining the
capital loss in the amount of $16,392.91
The Ninth Circuit in Boothe removed the perceived obstacle of direct
connection between the thief and victim, and did so when the theft
spanned forty-three to sixty-one years (from the fraudulent sale by Mr.
Dooley in 1916, to Mr. Boothe’s innocent purchase in 1959, to
discovery in 1977), multiple purchasers (Mr. Mason to Mr. Davis, to Mr.
Boothe), and apparent judicial and administrative acceptance of validity
(inclusion in Mr. Davis’s estate, and Bureau of Land Management
holding). These attributes of time, multiple sales, and apparent title/
acceptance will often be present in the Nazi-looted art cases. This
makes Boothe very citable, but the sharp differences in opinion noted by
the Ninth Circuit persist.
2. Krahmer v. United States
In 1985, the same year the Ninth Circuit decided Boothe, the claims
court decided Krahmer v. United States, another theft loss deduction
case.92 In Krahmer not only was the timing of the alleged theft an issue,
but another issue, particularly pertinent in art cases, also emerged. The
distinction between losses attributable to thefts involving art and those to
88. “[T]he majority and Judge Hamblen have taken an overly simplistic view of
the facts . . . by telescoping the relevant events which occurred here, so as to produce a
single transaction giving rise to a deductible loss, rather than two distinct and separable
events having different tax consequences.” Boothe, 82 T.C. at 809 (Körner, J.,
dissenting). By separating the loss into two component parts, Judge Körner was able to
bridge the two myopic competing views.
89. Id. at 810.
90. Id. (“I would therefore hold that he suffered a theft loss in 1959, when he
purchased the nonexistent rights, in the amount of $4,400, which, not being discovered
until 1977, was deductible by him in that year under section 165(e), subject to the
limiting provisions of section 165(c)(3).”).
91. See id. at 811 for the computation.
92. Krahmer v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 49 (1985), aff’d in part, 810 F.2d 1145
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
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misattribution or authenticity raised concerns about the scope and
meaning of theft involving art for tax purposes.
Mr. Krahmer had purchased over the years many paintings from Mr.
Mitscherlich, an art dealer. Two paintings proved problematic. One was
attributed by the art dealer to Nicholas Poussin. Mr. Krahmer had paid
$30,000 for the Poussin painting, which he later sold for $2000 when it
was determined not to be by Poussin, but by Poussin’s nephew instead.
The second painting bore the signature of “W. M. Chase” and the taxpayer
paid $5000 for it. The Chase signature on the painting was later
determined to be a forgery and the painting was thereafter sold for only
$300, resulting in a $4700 loss. The taxpayer claimed theft losses arising
from each transaction.
The Krahmer trial court denied a theft loss deduction for misattribution
of the Poussin painting. The court determined that since there was no
forgery but only “an erroneous statement by the seller as to the likely
artist,” it would be necessary for the taxpayer to establish that the seller
defrauded the taxpayer by “knowingly and intentionally misattributing”
the work.93 The taxpayer’s evidence as to the dealer’s status as an
experienced art expert, although not a Poussin specialist, as well as his
allegations concerning the dealer’s course of conduct as implying deceit
were unpersuasive as to knowing and intentional misattribution.
The trial court, however, drew a clear and easy distinction between the
two paintings. It allowed the deduction for the second painting, with the
forged Chase signature, as ipso facto fraudulent: “Unlike the ‘Poussin,’
the ‘Chase’ painting was signed, and that signature was a forgery. Thus,
anyone who sustained a loss on purchase in the belief that the painting
was by William Merritt Chase was the victim of a theft by false
pretenses or swindle.”94
As to the government’s contention that the taxpayer must be the direct
victim of the forger, the trial court was not persuaded:
It is apparent that Congress’ concern was not to punish the wrongdoer but to
provide tax relief to the victim of the loss . . . . The intended connection is
between the taxpayer and the loss, or more specifically in this case between the
taxpayer and the theft, not between the taxpayer and the thief. Thus, it should
make no difference in the application of this relief statute whether the taxpayer
dealt directly with the forger or was the victim once or several steps removed.95
....
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 52.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Here, plaintiff has suffered a loss at the hands of a forger, however distant in
time or privity was the forger’s act. Plaintiff need not know the identity of the
forger. He need only prove that the forgery was the cause of the loss. By his
discovery of the forgery, perpetrated by persons unknown, plaintiff has satisfied
his burden.96

On appeal in 1987, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held the
lower court’s determination that the “mere existence of the forged
signature . . . was sufficient to prove a theft by false pretenses is incorrect
as a matter of law, and . . . reverse[d] it.”97 Significantly the Federal
Circuit held that the taxpayer was required to show that the art dealer,
from whom the taxpayer had purchased the painting, knowingly and
intentionally defrauded him by the misattribution. The court required an
active deception at the time of the taxpayer’s purchase, reasserting a
direct link between the thief and the taxpayer. Interestingly, although
the lower court had discussed the Boothe decision extensively,98 the
Federal Circuit did not distinguish or even reference Boothe on appeal.99
3. Suddenness and Mistakes
What is the underlying concern of the IRS in requiring direct contact
between the thief and the taxpayer? The answer may be nothing more
than an unexamined historic imperative, the traditional section 165(c)(3)
suddenness requirement, or with shades of Mary Frances Allen and her
brooch, distinguishing theft from mistake.
Recall that section 165(c) limits an individual’s nonbusiness,
nonprofitseeking losses to those losses arising “from fire, storm, shipwreck,
96. Id. at 53.
97. Krahmer v. United States, 810 F.2d 1145, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
98. See Krahmer, 9 Cl. Ct. at 53.
99. Six years later, however, the Tax Court in another left loss deduction case did
make an approving reference. See Jensen v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 543, 546
(1993). The Jensens had unknowingly invested in a Ponzi scheme run by Chacklan
Enterprises. Id. at 544. The taxpayers’ actual investment was through their long-trusted
broker, Mr. Howarter, and not directly with Chacklan. Id. Like his clients, Mr.
Howarter was not a knowing participant in the Ponzi scheme. Id. at 545. Once the
scheme collapsed later in the same year, the taxpayers claimed a theft loss deduction,
which the Service denied. Id. at 545, 546. Although the Service agreed a theft had
occurred, it argued the taxpayers were not entitled to a theft deduction because they were
not direct investors in Chacklan Enterprises. Id. at 546. The Tax Court determined as a
factual matter, however, that the taxpayers were investors in Chacklan, specifically
stating that “[t]here is no requirement that an investor have direct contact with the entity
in which he is investing.” Id. Jensen is noteworthy because the Tax Court cited Boothe
in the face of a pointed IRS argument that there was no direct contact between the
taxpayer and the thief. See id. However tempting it is to read Jensen as an endorsement
by the Tax Court of Boothe’s no-direct-contact-required, such an unqualified statement
in unwarranted. First, the court found that the taxpayers were investors in Chacklan. Id.
Second, because the Jensens were Nevada residents, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Boothe governed. See id. at 544.
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or other casualty, or from theft.” In interpreting “other casualty,” courts
adopted the principle of ejusdem generis, that is, interpret the phrase in
light of the surrounding terms.100 Consequently, deductible losses from
“other casualty” require an identifiable event that is “sudden, cataclysmic,
and devastating,”101 or “of a sudden, unusual or unexpected nature”102
put most simply, “only sudden events can be deductible casualties.”103 If
the tincture of time underlies deductibility for “fire, storm, shipwreck, or
other casualty,” it may, consciously or not, also color the interpretation
of “or from theft.”
A second rationale for the IRS insistence on a direct link between the
thief and the taxpayer may be an institutional belief that defining theft in
a hard edged way, making theft a fortress, best distinguishes theft from
mere “loss.” Mary Frances Allen and her missing brooch illustrates the
slippery slope the IRS intends to avoid. In the context of art, the slippery
slope includes the critical distinction between theft and misattribution.
A time honored method of art education is for students to copy the
masters—there is no criminal intent at the time.104 As time passes,
100. See, for example, White v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967) holding
that the loss of a diamond from a ring when a hand was slammed in a door was a
casualty loss:
The principle of ejusdem generis as it is presently applied does no violence to
congressional intent. Its application has been consistently broadened so that
wherever unexpected, accidental force is exerted on property and the taxpayer
is powerless to prevent application of the force because of the suddenness
thereof or some disability, the resulting direct and proximate damage causes a
loss which is like or similar to losses arising from the causes specifically
enumerated in section 165(c)(3).
101. Popa v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 130, 132 (1979), acq. in result 1981-2 C.B. 2.
102. Rev. Rul. 63-232, 1963-2 C.B. 97.
103. Joel S. Newman, Of Taxes and Other Casualties, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 964
(1983) (“Perhaps the problem is one of timing. It is generally easy to determine when a
deductible casualty occurs, especially since, under current law, only sudden events can
be deductible casualties.”).
104. Of course, not all copies proceed from purely academic motives. In State v.
Wright Hepburn Webster Gallery, Ltd., 314 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1970), the New York
Attorney General unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a sale of paintings advertised as
created by “Master Forger David Stein.” At the time, Mr. Stein was in a Paris jail for
selling art forgeries. Id. at 663. The court noted:
[H]e has apparently been permitted by the French authorities to produce
paintings “in the style of” such renowned artists as Chagall, Matisse, Picasso,
Braque and others, subject to the proviso that they bear his own signature,
“Stein, D.,” rather than the simulated signatures of these masters as had been
his prior practice.
Id. The Attorney General was concerned that over time Mr. Stein’s signature would be
removed and the works would enter the art market as original works. Id. at 664. The
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certainty decreases and confusion increases. To shift to the U.S. tax
system a measure of monetary liability for mistakes in judgment should
require a higher threshold of congressional intent. A lower threshold
would greatly increase the availability of the theft deduction in personal
transactions where the underlying transaction concerned judgment and
not theft. The U.S. tax system would then become an insurer of sorts not
only for theft but mistakes in judgment as well, something Congress did
not intend.
A third rationale for requiring a nexus between thief and taxpayer is
that to allow otherwise could ultimately blur the tax distinctions between
generally deductible business losses and generally nondeductible
personal losses, so that all losses become deductible.105 Moreover, in the
context of Nazi-looted art, the original illegal taking may not have
involved a U.S. taxpayer at the time of the Nazi regime’s theft. The U.S.
taxpayer became involved generally only over time and with the passage
of the work of art through the international art market. Allowing the
U.S. tax system to address an injury to a non-U.S. taxpayer from sixty
years ago could result in an unwarranted expansion of section 165. This
limited view of the time of injury however, ignores the reality of the
ongoing injury to the current U.S. taxpayer. The injury began in World
War II and continues.
V. POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF USING THE TAX CODE
Whether or not the Internal Revenue Code can be used as a tool for
resolving Nazi-looted art cases, the broader question is whether it should
be so used. Do any policy considerations support or defeat the use?
Unquestionably, the law should assist people in resolving disputes; so
to the extent tax consequences can help resolve honest disputes,
especially between two innocents, this is a positive step. Yet any
attempt to shift financial liability from an individual taxpayer to all
taxpayers raises legitimate concerns. These include direct tax policy
concerns, such as revenue loss, vertical equity, and conceptual concerns,
and non-tax concerns, such as the United States increasingly becoming
an art theft haven.
court was not persuaded that the Attorney General’s suspicion of future misconduct
qualified as a current nuisance, and the sale was allowed. Id. at 664, 668.
105. Something of this sort may also underlie the issue concerning the availability
of the theft loss deduction for stock losses attributable to Enron- or WorldCom-type
conduct. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-27, 2004-16 I.R.B. 782; Robert Willens, Financial
Misrepresentations by Management May Lead to ‘Theft’ Losses for Corporate
Stockholders, DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 29, 2005, at J1 (“[W]e can safely conclude that the
indispensable key to the claim that a theft loss has been sustained . . . is the legal concept
of privity . . . .”).
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A. Revenue Loss
Inherently, deductions lower the amount of tax collected.106 As a
purely academic discussion, no estimate as to revenue cost exists; but the
cost, relative to the entirety of the income tax system, would probably not
be significant. In determining the amount of the loss, the taxpayer’s
basis is the starting point, not fair market value.107 In addition, since
1983, section 165(h) has imposed a quantitative restriction limiting theft
loss deductions to those in excess of ten percent of a taxpayer’s AGI.108
This quantitative restriction, coupled with the deduction’s availability
only in the year the loss is sustained without carryover or carryback,
suggests that the utility of the theft loss deduction will be limited.
Moreover, structural limitations applicable across the board to all
taxpayers, including the phase out of itemized deductions and the
possible imposition of the Alternative Minimum Tax, could similarly limit
the revenue loss. One might well wonder, in fact, if these quantitative
limitations and restrictions defeat using the theft loss in this context as a
practical matter.
B. Vertical Equity
Equity considerations, however, appear more troublesome.109 Because
the art most likely to be in controversy will be of great value,110 the
ownership of such works similarly is most likely to be concentrated in
the high income bracket taxpayer. Thus, high income taxpayers would
likely stand to benefit the most from the application of the theft loss
deduction to Nazi art restitution cases. For some commentators, that
would be enough to reject the application.
106. This is admittedly a general proposition; in any particular case a deduction
could be “wasted” because there is insufficient income to absorb it.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 165(b) (2000).
108. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
203(b), 96 Stat. 324, 422.
109. Horizontal equity concerns, such as the concern that similarly situated taxpayers
should be treated similarly, are notoriously difficult to address, particularly when unique
works were stolen over sixty years ago. Who is the similarly situated taxpayer? Is it one
who purchased the painting unwittingly directly from the thief? Or is it someone who
bought a Degas only to have it stolen from her home? In any case, it is hard to see the
difference from a tax perspective because the taxpayer no longer has the painting.
110. See TRIENENS, supra note 30, at 97 (“I am almost at the point of saying that if
the art isn’t worth $3 million, don’t go after it.”) (quoting Thomas Kline, counsel for the
Gutmann family in the Degas dispute).
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This observation of high end utility should not be sufficient in and of
itself to reject the application of the theft loss deduction. Any allowable
deduction in our system is more valuable to a higher bracket taxpayer
than to a lower bracket taxpayer; such is the nature of progressive
rates.111 As long as the deduction is available to all, the equity of its
lopsided use should cause consideration of the deduction’s purpose.
Although limited, the legislative history suggests deductible section
165(c)(3) losses are those that are extraordinary and nonrecurring,
“beyond the average or usual losses incurred by most taxpayers in dayto-day living,” and that are sufficient in size to have a significant effect
upon an individual’s ability to pay federal income taxes.112
Applying this standard, an ownership dispute over a work of art
stemming from Nazi confiscation over sixty years ago handily meets the
extraordinary standard; one hopes it meets the nonrecurring standard for
that taxpayer, and the sufficient in size standard has arguably been
addressed by the ten percent norm. The ability-to-pay reference is more
difficult to address because of its uncertain meaning in this context.
Does the loss of a work of art compromise the taxpayer’s ability to pay
income taxes? Arguably not, since the art does not generate dollars with
which to pay tax. This argument proves too much since items of
nonbusiness, nonprofit seeking personal property generally do not
generate income subject to tax. If the ability-to-pay standard is suggesting
that the taxpayer will need to spend income to replace the stolen
property, this is uncertain in our context given the uniqueness of the
work and acknowledging that art, unlike a home, is not a necessity that
must be replaced. The ability-to-pay argument should not be determinative
because in the context of section 165(c)(3)’s history, normative concerns
about the taxpayer’s victimization by outside, sudden, uncontrollable
forces seem more important.
C. Conceptual Concerns
The Haig-Simons income formulation provides a recognized starting
point in articulating a conceptual framework for the income tax. Under
the formula, income is “the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in

111. The U.S. income tax system is highly stratified. Most American taxpayers pay
more in payroll taxes than they pay in income tax; most individual income tax returns
claim the standard deduction rather than itemized deductions. See EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT 17-19 (2002).
112. H.R. REP. NO. 88-749, at 52 (1963); S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 57 (1964).
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question.”113 Using the theft loss deduction when returning Nazi-looted
art to the original owner can be seen as consistent with the Haig-Simons
formulation as there has been an overall reduction in the taxpayer’s store
of property rights.114 The charitable deduction is more problematic as
two offsetting effects arguably exist. By transferring the art work to a
charity, the taxpayer, as in the theft loss scenario, has decreased the
value of his store of property rights. But by choosing to effect that same
transfer as a gratuitous donation, the taxpayer may be seen as exercising
rights of consumption by foregoing a sale. Nevertheless, by the
longstanding policy considerations underlying the charitable deduction,
such charitable dispositions are not considered as giving rise to income.
Congress has chosen to encourage transfers to charities, presumably
since the charities assist the government in fulfilling some of its public
functions.
D. Non-Tax Considerations
A traditional apprehension is that deductions that proceed from
normative, noneconomic concerns are inappropriate in the tax system
and contribute needlessly to the complexity of the system.115 Many
commentators today acknowledge that a pure tax system is unlikely and
acknowledge, if not support, recognition of such in the tax system. As
previously discussed, the tax system has already been used recently to
address Nazi-era reparations.116 But would the norm of a tax settlement
in these cases have a negative ripple effect elsewhere? Would tax
settlements increase the flow of illicit art to the United States or lower a
buyer’s diligence in purchasing if the buyer is aware the tax system may
be a partner at the ready when the purchase goes bad? Is there not
something distasteful about United States charities and museums being
used as conduits or repositories for looted art? The answer to each of
these questions is probably yes. The questions, however, miss the mark.
The goal is to support the return of Nazi-looted art consistent with
stated United States policy. Nazi looting of art is an historic fact. If
113. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
114. Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions—A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another
“Deal”?, 2002 MICH. L. REV. DETROIT C.L. 1, 37-40 (2002).
115. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit
Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31
STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
116. See discussion supra Part III.
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more of it resurfaces, whether in the United States or elsewhere, that is a
good thing, as finding the art is the first step in returning the art to its
original owner. To counter a possible increase in the flow of illicit art
into the United States, three practical points might be addressed. First,
lawmakers could limit use of the theft loss deduction to cases involving
the restitution of Nazi-looted art, and not any stolen art, to the victim.
Second, lawmakers could restrict the tax deduction to Nazi-looted art
formally entered on a recognized international registry for Nazi-looted
art as of a certain date. Finally, in order to deal with the problem of
“fake” Nazi-looted art, the Service should require expert testimony from
a qualified appraiser as to authenticity as part of the taxpayer’s return.
Due diligence on the part of buyers is unlikely to decrease substantially
because of a deduction. No one wants to lose money, and a deduction is
of course only a partial recovery of money spent, unlike a credit.
Moreover, much of the contested art was purchased years ago when
buyers’ diligence passively relied on the reputation of art galleries.
Today, with the ready availability of Internet database searches and the
steady drumbeat of news stories, buyers can fairly be held to a higher,
active standard of diligence. The passage of time thus has more likely
increased the due diligence of buyers, and one can rightly question the
bona fides of recent purchases.
Charities as conduits and museums as repositories for art of questionable
provenance does seem distasteful at first.117 In the long run, however,
the art returns to the original owners, or with their agreement and
approval, to a wider public ownership.
V. CONCLUSION
Six decades after the end of World War II, controversies over the
ownership of Nazi-looted art continue to emerge. Time has worked a
shift in perceptions and expectations for those controversies; time is no
longer an ally for the repose of title. This unsettling of bona fide
expectations of title for an innocent buyer raises claims in law and in
equity that are equally meritorious to those of the original owners. For a
legal system that adjudicates on a case-by-case basis, a claim over
ownership of a unique work of art is a zero sum game—one winner, one
loser. This harsh reality of uniqueness, set against the competing
interests of legitimate market concerns and demands of restorative
justice, requires fresh and open inquiry into workable solutions.
117. This issue is not new for museums. Only recently, however, is the issue
discussed widely in a forthright manner. See Hugh Eakin & Elisabetta Povoledo, Met’s
Fears on Looted Antiquities Are Not New, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at E1.
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Tax is an eminently practical system that affords two possible
strategies for those ownership disputes. Using the charitable deduction
would generally resolve the dispute by creating an outright public
ownership, and hence public benefit and oversight. Using the theft loss
deduction, ownership would generally remain private, but the public
would nevertheless bear some of the direct financial costs in the
ownership shift from one party to the other. The public benefit is
admittedly less direct: assistance in dispute resolution, support for private
ownership of property, and protection of legitimate market expectations.
Perhaps because of this imbalance in public costs and benefits, the
availability of the theft loss deduction may not be as straightforward as
the charitable deduction. Time, manifested by the IRS’s apparent
requirement of direct nexus between the thief and the taxpayer, should
not act as a stumbling block for the theft loss deduction strategy in the
limited context of Nazi-looted art. The language of the Code does not
require the nexus and perhaps even recognizes a different timeframe for
theft. Case law support for tracing the theft back in time through
multiple purchases does exist. Finally, general tax policy concerns do
not and should not outweigh the stated United States policy to assist in
the restoration of Nazi-looted art. The impossible eternal triangle of
thief, owner, and innocent buyer should not find support in tax and time.
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